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A look at the Opium Wars in the 19th century, and the use of opium by the army in China, India and
elsewhere
 
Lukasz Kamienski
The Opium Wars are an exceptional example of the complex connections between international
politics, war, and drugs; the use of opium by troops is part of this complexity.
Given the pervasive consumption of opium in China it is hardly surprising that many soldiers of the
emperor’s army who were fighting in the Opium Wars to defend the country against the flood of
Indian opium were, paradoxically and tragically, drug addicts. 
A decade after the first Opium War, the Taiping Rebellion (1851-1864) took power in southern
China. Its success was the result not only of the weakening of the country and the military caused
by the war but also of the epidemic addiction rates of nearly 90 percent among the ranks of the
emperor’s army. The Chinese armed forces in the mid-nineteenth century can therefore be well
described as the world’s largest “opium army.” But, of course, they were not the first military to use
opium routinely.
The Sikhs, among the greatest Indian warriors, were regularly slightly high on opium for the same
reasons as the Ottoman soldiers, earlier in the sixteenth century. In 1546 the French naturalist Pierre
Belon, while documenting his travel experiences to Asia Minor and Egypt, reported the abuse of
opium by the Turks. Belon’s account was slightly exaggerated, but it is still worth invoking: 
There is not a Turk who would not purchase opium with his last coin; he carries the drug on him in
war and in peace. They eat opium because they think they will thus become more courageous and
have less fear of the dangers of war. At the time of war, such large quantities are purchased it is
difficult to find any left.
Henry Waterfield,  a general major who served in India from the times of the great anti-British
mutiny in 1857-1859, testified that 80 percent of Sikh soldiers were “occasional opium takers,” 15
percent used it regularly, and about 0.5 percent were heavy abusers. Another British officer, William
Biscoe,  reported that  in his  Sikh regiment nearly 60 percent  of men “took it  and left  it  off  as
occasion required.” In fact, in terms of combat performance “it was not considered a defect in a
man if he took opium occasionally.” 
When the drug was elusive, it was the army’s responsibility to supply soldiers because moderate
opium eating had a positive and desired impact on the attitude and fighting performance of the
troops. Sometimes the use of the intoxicant in India was so deeply rooted in everyday life and
customs that it was a cultural norm. Take the case of the Rajputs, the descendants of the Hindu
warrior caste of North India who, probably from the 1720s on, used opium regularly and had a habit
of sharing it with their horses and camels before leaving for a mission to patrol the desert.
The Indian commander, Sirsubha Sakharm Martand, testified that 
[m]y  long  connection  with  and  intimate  knowledge  of  the  State  army  enables  me  to  say
unhesitatingly that a moderate dose of opium is an unmixed good to the consumers. Opium eating
does not necessarily lead to immorality or crime. It gives staying power under great exertions such
as  long  marches  and  hunting  excursions.  As  compared  with  alcohol  drinkers,  I  found  opium
consumers to be steady, quiet, reliable, and obedient soldiers. In my time I found 40 to 50 percent
using opium in the State army.
Also the general in command of the Indian state army in Indore, Balmukund 
Gayadeen, confirmed: 
Opium is eaten as well as drunk in the army. The percentage of consumers in my opinion is 50. A
moderate use of opium is known not to tell  against the physique of soldiers. Opium-eaters are
sober,  quiet,  obedient,  enterprising,  and attentive to their duties. They can stand hard marches
under the influence of the drug. If the use of opium is accompanied by the use of milk, sweetmeat,
or any substantial food as is usually the case, it is not only harmless but positively beneficial. It
staves off hunger, and keeps the user from the effects of exposure to cold or heat. Opium is also
useful to animals and makes them capable of undergoing hard work and long journeys.
Unlike the Indian military, which generally saw the moderate use of opium as enhancing fighting
spirit and combat performance, opium abuse had a severe impact on the Chinese troops. This was
clearly in evidence already in the 1830s during the quelling of the Rebellion of the Yao ethnic group
in South China. 
Xi En, the governor responsible for the suppression of the Yao uprising, repeatedly sent disturbing
messages to the emperor reporting that seven in ten Chinese soldiers were opium addicts. He was
pessimistic for a reason; how could an army of opium-eaters achieve any victory? The imperial
investigative  censor,  Feng  Zhanxun,  wrote  in  a  similar  fashion  that  “[m]any  Cantonese  and
Fujianese soldiers smoked opium, there are even more among the officers. They are cowards and
they have spoiled our operation. They are really despicable.” 
Opium made the soldiers forget about hunger, withstand the cold, endure the hardships of military
life, and numbed them emotionally. Also, it was used for medicinal purposes to relieve a whole
range of  illnesses  and was  often  taken prophylactically,  especially  by the  troops  posted  in  the
empire’s southern provinces. Most soldiers, however, took opium because of their addiction. 
The remarkable difference in the impact of opium on the Indian and Chinese troops—positive and
negative,  desirable and unwanted,  invigorating and debilitating—can be explained partly by the
different culture of drug use, that is, the Indians being more temperate than the Chinese. There was
also  another  phenomenon at  work,  because,  as  mentioned,  depending on such factors  as  dose,
capacity of the body to tolerate and withstand intoxicants, and the expectations and attitudes of the
user, opium can have either stimulating or tranquilizing effects. 
Medical and clinical studies have focused mostly on the drug’s sedative properties; therefore its
boosting effects, the ones that the Indian warriors took great advantage of, at first glance might be
surprising. While the Indian fighting men used opium advisedly and for the pragmatic reason of
gaining combat advantage, the majority of Chinese troopers were hooked on the drug and rendered
ineffective for duty. 
What is more, the habit in the army had snowballing consequences: from the 1860s on, Chinese
troops had been a major force that triggered the further diffusion of opium smoking among the
civilians in the southern provinces. The Imperial Army, in short, turned into a powerful catalyst for
the spread of the epidemic of addiction throughout society.
In his book The Social Life of Opium in China, Yangwen Zheng firmly argues: 
Opium had demilitarized the fighting machine, as soldiers found the best way to escape boredom
and combat responsibilities. Given seven thousand soldiers out of ten thousand were invalids, any
battle would have been lost. Here, however, it was not only the battle against the Yao people that
was lost but also the first Opium War itself.
It was not wise to send heavy opium-smokers to battle, for they lacked the will for combat. Drug
abuse destroyed individual fighting spirit and the morale of the troops. Feng Zhanxun observed that
“the  poison of  opium is  that  when  the  people  smoke it,  they  waste  themselves  and ruin  their
business, and when the soldiers smoke it, they become tired and break the army’s discipline.” 
In the same vein, the English physician C. Toogood Downing, who lived in Canton, noted that “the
class of people who consume opium in China are those of the male sex, chiefly between twenty and
fifty-five years old, and of all ranks in society. It affects soldiers very much, rendering them weak
and decrepit.” 
In that respect, it is worth mentioning the ancient Chinese thinker on war, Sun Pin, active in the
fourth century BC, who grasped the ultimate truth: “When an army is internally exhausted, even
numerous expenditures of energy will not result in solidity. When you see the enemy is difficult to
subdue, if the army still acts wantonly between Heaven and Earth, it will be swiftly defeated.”
Lieutenant Alexander Murray remarked that he believed that the Chinese soldiers took opium to
raise their courage and prepare for battle. To his surprise, and contrary to what he had expected,
Murray did not see them being euphoric or numbed but only insanely manic. He recounted: 
About twenty wounded men were taken into our hospital, where their wounds were dressed; but
several died from the immense quantity of opium they had taken to get their courage up to the
fighting point. Most of the attacking party were mad with excitement, produced probably by this
abominable drug.
What Murray  also expressed was actually  the prevailing view among the English soldiers  and
officers at the time, namely that a proper enemy has his natural courage grounded in character,
values,  intrinsic  fortitude,  and  proper  training.  During  the  “opium punitive  expedition”  against
China,  a well-armed British army encountered an enemy that proved to be composed of “half-
humans driven mad by an abominable drug.” 
For  the  British,  an  unnaturally  boosted  enemy was  not  a  worthy  opponent.  Although  military
technology gave the European soldiers a decisive advantage,  they did not see it in terms of an
unnatural enhancement. The point is that technology was considered merely as an extension of their
human abilities while opium changed the body from within. The issue was not about artificial tools
of war but about the artificially created condition of a soldier. 
Of course, the British were somewhat hypocritical in their reasoning—it was, in fact, they who had
substantially contributed to the opium addiction they later criticized. Their expedition, moreover,
was an important element of England’s drug-funded imperialism, prompting the expansion of the
opium habit in Chinese society and the armed forces.
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